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Abstract
More than any other EU institution, the Court of Justice of the European Union has upheld the presump-
tion of mutual trust in EU criminal law cooperation. Surprisingly though, despite mutual trust’s centrality
in the Court’s jurisprudence, it has long not qualified nor properly elaborated the notion of trust, but rather
held on to its presumed existence based on a high level of fundamental rights protection throughout the
Union. This article will assess the important role of the Court in establishing, upholding and ultimately
qualifying the trust presumption in the EU criminal justice context. Along the lines of a number of key
cases, the narrative of a strong defence of (the presumption of) mutual trust appears, but also of an
evolution toward more room for rebuttal in recent cases. This signals the increased weight given to
fundamental rights protection in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
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A. Introduction
The term mutual trust is widely used in the EU criminal justice discourse, for example in policy
documents, legislation, and case law. To be more precise, it has become the focal point of the EU’s
criminal justice policy,1 and is “the bedrock upon which EU justice policy should be built.”2
Nevertheless, there is no commonly agreed definition or understanding of its scope and funda-
mentals in EU circles—in other words, the institutions.3 The term was given prominence from the
beginning of EU criminal law4 cooperation when the 1999 Tampere European Council hailed
mutual recognition as the cornerstone principle of criminal justice cooperation.5 Mutual
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12010 O.J. (C 115/1) 1.2.1 (identifying in the Stockholm Programme: “[E]nsuring trust and finding new ways increase
reliance on, and mutual understanding between, the different systems in the Member States” as “one of the main challenges
for the future”).
2Justice Agenda for 2020—Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth Within the Union, COM (2014) 144 final; confirmed
in the Commission’s Work Programme 2017, COM (2016) 710 final.
3See also AukeWillems,Mutual Trust as a Term of Art in EU Criminal Law: Revealing its Hybrid Character, 9 EUR. J. LEGAL
STUD. 211 (2016).
4A note at the outset: The term “EU criminal law” is potentially misleading. We are not dealing with conventional criminal
law; no norms that pose an immediate threat to individuals are created at EU level. Nevertheless, the term is widely accepted to
describe the body of law and policy under examination here.
5Eur. Consult. Ass., Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions, para. 53 (Oct. 15–16, 1999).
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recognition gained further importance with the introduction of the Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice (“AFSJ”), the EU’s version of a judicial space that came into force through the Treaty of
Amsterdam. Additionally, mutual recognition especially gained importance with the adoption of
the European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”),6 applying mutual recognition to extradition.7 In essence,
mutual recognition requires Member States to give full recognition to judicial decisions from other
jurisdictions across the EU.8 The Lisbon Treaty incorporated mutual recognition and has thus
become part of primary EU law.9
Mutual recognition functions on a presumption of mutual trust. The logic is that the
“extraterritoriality of judicial decisions,”10 created by mutual recognition, will only be accepted
if there is sufficient mutual trust between Member States.11 In other words, mutual trust serves
as the foundation of mutual recognition. As noted by Janssens, however, “the precise link between
trust and recognition has not been decisively elucidated.”12 Herlin–Karnell adds, “[t]he key
problem that arises when discussing the notion of EU criminal law cooperation is that there is
no articulation of what ‘mutual trust’ actually means in the field of criminal law. This lack of
conceptualization is a significant lacuna in EU criminal law cooperation.”13
In addition to conceptual uncertainty, the feasibility of a presumption of mutual trust was soon
questioned,14 and it turned out that “[b]lind mutual recognition of foreign decisions is not feasible
due to the lack of trust that is caused by the differences in member states’ criminal justice systems.”15
An influential study conducted by Vernimmen-van Tiggelen et al. concluded—on the basis of inter-
views with practitioners working in the field—that “mutual trust was simply assumed to exist . . .
[i]n reality, this trust is still not spontaneously felt and is by nomeans always evident in practice . . . .”16
Despite the fact that the pre–Lisbon Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”)17 had
limited jurisdiction on matters relating to criminal law and was subject to a five year transitional
period under Lisbon,18 it has not hesitated to rule on matters relating to the AFSJ.19 More than any
6Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, 2002 O.J. (L190/1) (EC) [hereafter EAW].
7See, e.g., LIBOR KLIMEK, EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT (2014) (discussing more of the EAW).
8See, e.g., CHRISTINE JANSSENS, THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN EU LAW (2013) (discussing more on mutual
recognition).
9Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts.
67(3), 82(1), July 6, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 1. [hereinafter TEU and TFEU respectively].
10See Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe ThroughMutual Recognition, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL. 682 (2007).
11See, e.g., Thomas Wischmeyer, Generating Trust Through Law? Judicial Cooperation in the European Union and the
“Principle of Mutual Trust”, 17 GERMAN L.J. 339 (2016) (regarding mutual trust in EU criminal law); see generally LA
CONFIANCE MUTUELLE DANS L’ESPACE PÉNAL EUROPÉEN/MUTUAL TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL AREA (Gilles De
Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2005).
12JANSSENS, supra note 8, at 142.
13Ester Herlin-Karnell, Constitutional Principles in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in EU SECURITY AND JUSTICE
LAW AFTER LISBON AND STOCKHOLM 38, at 42 (Diego Acosta Arcarazo & Cian C. Murphy eds., 2014).
14See Susie Alegre and Marisa Leaf,Mutual Recognition in European Judicial Cooperation: A Step Too Far Too Soon?, 10(2)
EUR. L.J. 200 (2004).
15Gert Vermeulen, Wendy de Bondt & Peter Verbeke, Correction Mechanisms: A Necessity in the Current Cooperation
Climate, in 42 RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS IN THE EU 337 (Gert Vermeulen,
Wendy de Bondt & Charlotte Ryckman eds., 2012).
16THE FUTURE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION/L’AVENIR DE LA
RECONNAISSANCE MUTUELLE EN MATIÈRE PÉNALE DANS L’UNION EUROPÉENNE 20 (Giséle Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen,
Laura Surano & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2009); see also Ulrich Sieber, Die Zukunft des Europäischen Strafrechts, 121
ZEITSCHRIFT GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 1, 33–34 (2009) (concluding that mutual trust does not exist).
17The post-Lisbon name of the Court is used throughout, being mindful of its pre-Lisbon designation: European Court of
Justice (“ECJ”) even though this term is still used nowadays.
18Accordingly, until December 2014, the pre-Lisbon rules that limited the Court’s jurisdiction remained in force. See TFEU
protocol no. 36.
19See, e.g., Koen Lenaerts, The Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 59
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 255 (2010); Lars Bay Larsen, Judicial Control Within the European Penal Area, in THE JUDICIAL CONTROL
IN EU COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 13 (Stefan Braum & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2009).
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other EU institution, the Court safeguarded the presumption of trust and became one of its
strongest defenders.20 Despite mutual trust’s centrality in the Court’s ASFJ jurisprudence, the
Court has not qualified or properly elaborated the notion of trust. Rather, the Court held on
to its presumed existence based on a high level of fundamental rights protection throughout
the EU based on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).21
Moraru, however, observed that “EU law and [the] jurisprudence of the [CJEU] seem to attach
different meanings and effects to ‘mutual trust’ depending on the specific field of the AFSJ,”
moreover, “[t]he fact that most of the CJEU case law dealing with issues related to the clarification
of the meaning and effects of ‘mutual trust’ stems from national courts is an indication of the
confusion surrounding the EU concept of ‘mutual trust’.”22
This Article will assess the important role of the CJEU in establishing, upholding, and
ultimately qualifying the trust presumption in the EU criminal justice context. The issue is
not isolated, but linked with other areas of EU involvement—predominantly EU asylum
law—which will be discussed when relevant.23 Along the lines of relevant case law, this Article
will lay out the narrative of a strong defense for—the presumption of—mutual trust, but also
of an evolution toward more room for rebuttal in recent cases.24 The Court long resisted urgent
calls from academic commentators and practitioners to allow rebuttal of the trust presumption on
human rights grounds,25 as the negative impact of mutual recognition on fundamental rights26
was clearly visible.27
By doing so, the Court came to recognize mutual trust as a “normative principle underlying
cooperative regulatory instruments.”28 It is the normative content of the principle that this
Article is interested in, and the degree to which its existence is presumed to exist. Therefore,
the question this Article aims to answer is: How has the CJEU interpreted the principle of
mutual trust?
A majority of the cases in this Article center around the EAW. This cannot be a surprise in
light of the significance of the instrument. A further reason for the relatively large amount of
litigation on the EAW is attributed by Bay Larsen to the at times questionable legislative quality
of the EAW: “[B]y not clearly resolving difficult key questions or sometimes even leaving
such questions completely out of the legal text—[the EAW] often delegated legislative power
20See also Tomasz Ostropolski, The CJEU as a Defender of Mutual Trust, 6 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 166 (2015).
21See, e.g., SARAH SUMMERS, FAIR TRIALS: THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL TRADITION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2007).
22MadalinaMoraru, “Mutual Trust” from the Perspective of National Courts: A Test in Legal Thinking, inMAPPINGMUTUAL
TRUST: UNDERSTANDING AND FRAMING THE ROLE OF MUTUAL TRUST IN EU LAW, 13 EUI WORKING PAPERS 37, 37 (Evelien
Brouwer & Damien Gerard eds., 2016).
23See Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic
Inter-State Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual, 31 Y.B. EUR. L. 319 (2012) (regarding an ASFJ wide
assessment).
24See also Ester Herlin-Karnell, From Mutual Trust to the Full Effectiveness of EU Law: 10 Years of the European Arrest
Warrant, 38 EUR. L. REV. 79 (2013).
25See, e.g., Malcom Anderson, Law Enforcement Cooperation in the EU and Fundamental Rights Protection, in CRIME,
RIGHTS AND THE EU: THE FUTURE OF POLICE AND JUDICIAL COOPERATION 105 (Martin Maik ed., 2008); Kai Ambos,
Mutual Recognition Versus Procedural Guarantees?, in CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ESSENTIAL
SAFEGUARDS 25 (Montserrat de Hoyos Sancho ed., 2008).
26See Paul de Hert, EU Criminal Law and Fundamental Rights, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU CRIMINAL LAW 105
(Valsamis Mitsilegas, Maria Bergström & Theodore Konstadinides eds., 2016) (discussing EU criminal law and fundamental
rights generally).
27See, e.g., The European Arrest Warrant eight years on—time to amend the Framework Decision?, FAIR TRIALS INTERNATIONAL
(Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.fairtrials.org/documents/EAW_EP_own_initiative_legislative_report.pdf (publishing various studies
on the negative impact of mutual recognition on fundamental rights).
28Damien Gerard, Mutual Trust as Constitutionalism?, in MAPPING MUTUAL TRUST: UNDERSTANDING AND FRAMING THE
ROLE OF MUTUAL TRUST IN EU LAW, 13 EUI WORKING PAPERS 69, 75 (Evelien Brouwer & Damien Gerard eds., 2016).
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to the ECJ.”29 One of the major controversies surrounding the EAW is the absence of a funda-
mental rights refusal ground—intended as the ultimate expression of mutual trust. There has
long been debate about how this absence should be interpreted.30
Section B will begin with the Court’s introduction of the idea of mutual trust in the criminal
law context in a series of cases on ne bis in idem. In section C, the first EAW case will be exam-
ined. In Advocaten voor de Wereld the Court confirmed the validity of the instrument and laid
the foundation for the cases to follow. Subsequent cases following this important judgment dealt
with questions about the limits of mutual recognition in relation to nationals, which is discussed
in section D. Then, in section E, Mantello is examined, which is the first EAW case directly
dealing with fundamental rights. Section F analyzes N.S., the first AFSJ case in which the trust
presumption was rebutted. Even though this judgment concerns asylum law, it has proven to be
a significant development that would later be exported to the criminal sphere. Nevertheless, the
first cases on a possible human rights refusal in the context of the EAW following N.S. did not yet
lead to the Court recognizing such possibility, as will be examined in section G. But these cases
were not the final word on the issue, and as the concerns surrounding the protection of
individual rights in the operation of the EAW grew, the Court ultimately came to move in
the direction of limiting mutual recognition when human rights concerns would warrant this.
But before it did, the Court once more underlined the importance of the principle of mutual trust
and its presumed existence in Opinion 2/13, which is the topic of section H. Ultimately, the
Court showed readiness to change its rigid position regarding the trust presumption in
Aranyosi and Căldăraru, which will be the focus of section I. The last section, J, will synthesize
the different components of a body of jurisprudence that evolved towards accepting that there
are limits to mutual trust in the criminal sphere. But despite this recent change of the Court’s
reading of mutual trust, its role in establishing and defending the trust presumption has been—
and remains—paramount.
B. Establishing the Trust Presumption: The EU–Wide Application of Ne Bis in Idem
The Court’s first view of mutual trust came in a ne bis in idem case. The principle of ne bis in idem,
or the principle—prohibition—of double jeopardy is contained in various international human
rights treaties,31 as well as in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.32 In its most basic form, the
principle gives individuals the right to not be prosecuted or tried twice for the same criminal con-
duct. In that capacity, ne bis in idem concerns a negative application of mutual recognition,
namely impeding further prosecution instead of aiding it.33 Traditionally, the principle functioned
only within a single jurisdiction, thus not barring a second prosecution for the same offense in
another state. In the EU context, a transnational variant of the rule applies.34 It first emerged in
29Lars Bay Larsen, Some Reflections on Mutual Recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in
CONSTITUTIONALISING THE EU JUDICIAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PERNILLA LINDH 139, 141 (Pascal Cardonnel,
Allan Rosas & Nils Wahl eds., 2012).
30See, e.g., Gian Luigi Tosato, Some Remarks on the Limits to the Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in Civil
and Criminal Matters Within the European Union, 38 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE
869 (2002).
31See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) a, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 14(7); Protocol No. 7 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 22, 1984, art. 4; see Auke Willems &
Paul de Hert, Artikel 4 Protocol 7 EVRM, in SDU COMMENTAAR EVRM DEEL 1: MATERIËLE RECHTEN 1472
(J.H. Gerards, Yves Haeck & Paul de Hert eds., 2013) (regarding the ECtHR’s interpretation of ne bis in idem).
32Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 50, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 [hereafter EU Charter].
33See also SAMULI MIETTINEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 181 (2013).
34See generally AnneWeyembergh & Inés Armada, The Principle of ne bis in idem in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU CRIMINAL LAW 189 (Valsamis Mitsilegas, Maria Bergström & Theodore
Konstadinides eds., 2016).
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Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (“CISA”)35 and aimed to
balance any possible negative effects of the abolition of the borders.36 In 2003, in Gözütok and
Brügge, the Court was asked in a preliminary reference procedure37 whether this principle
prohibited bringing charges on the same facts in one Member State, which another Member
State definitively brought to a close.38 The preliminary questions were referred by German
and Belgian Courts in cases concerning drugs trade (Gözütok) and causing grievous bodily injury
to a person (Brügge).39 Both suspects agreed with the Member State’s public prosecutor on a
financial settlement, upon payment of which further proceedings would be barred. Despite these
settlements, new proceedings were initiated against both suspects in another Member State.
In its landmark decision, the Court interpreted Article 54 CISA broadly,40 and held that ne bis
in idem does bar prosecution on the same facts as those which have been “finally disposed of” in
another Member State, even if no court has been involved in the settlement of the criminal
proceedings and the settlement does not take the form of a judicial decision. The main justification
for such an EU–wide application of ne bis in idem is mutual trust:
[T]here is a necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in their criminal
justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other
Member States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were
applied.41
The judgment came at the beginning of the mutual recognition era, and as observed by Thwaites:
“This approach strikingly recalls the reasoning of the Court in the Cassis de Dijon case on mutual
recognition regarding the free movement of products”42—the policy area, internal market, where
the Court first introduced mutual recognition.43
Not directly dealing with mutual recognition, though, the Court speaks of recognizing criminal
laws of other Member States, even when applying national law would lead to a different outcome,
clearly echoing the mutual recognition spirit. The concept that there is a necessary implication of
mutual trust established a strong presumption of trust, and the Court presented itself as a guardian
of the mutual trust rationale. The Court has since applied the principle of mutual trust in a similar
manner in other areas of judicial cooperation, such as civil matters,44 family law,45 insolvency
law,46 and asylum law.47
35Council Directive the Schengen as referred to in Article 1(2) of Council Decision 1999/435 2000 O.J. (L 239) 19 (EC).
36See Robin Lööf, 54 CISA and the Principles of ne bis in idem, 15 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 309 (2007).
37See TFEU art. 267.
38Joined Cases C-187/01 & C-385/01, Gözütok and Brügge, 2003 E.C.R. I-1345.
39See John Vervaele, Case Note on Gözütok and Brügge, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 795 (2004) (discussing the case); Maria
Fletcher, Some Developments to the Ne Bis in Idem Principle in the European Union: Criminal Proceedings Against Huseyn
Gozutok and Klaus Brugge, 66 MOD. L. REV. 769 (2003).
40See André Klip, Grensoverschrijdende Bescherming na Voldoen Transactie?, 2 SEW 92 (2004) (criticizing the broad
interpretation).
41Gözütok and Brügge, Joined Cases C-187/01 & C-385/01 at para. 33; see also Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer at para. 124, Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gözütok and Brügge (Sept. 19, 2002), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
recherche.jsf?language=en.
42Nadine Thwaites, Mutual Trust in Criminal Matters: the European Court of Justice Gives a First Interpretation of a
Provision of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, 4 GERMAN L.J. 253, 260 (2003).
43See Sandra Lavenex,Mutual Recognition and the Monopoly of Force: Limits of the Single Market Analogy, 14 J. EUR. PUB.
POL. 762 (2007) (regarding the flaws of this analogy).
44See, e.g., Case C-116/02, Gasser v. MISAT, 2003 E.C.R. I-14693; Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I03565,
paras. 24–28.
45See, e.g., Case C-195/08 PPU, Rinau, 2008, E.C.R. I-05271, para. 50; Case C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga v. Pelz, 2010
E.C.R. I-14247, paras. 46, 70.
46See, e.g., Case C-533/08, TNT Express Nederland v. AXA Versicherung AG, 2010 E.C.R. I-04107, paras. 54–56.
47See section F of this article below.
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In a string of cases on double jeopardy, the Court developed other aspects of ne bis in idem.48
These cases all have in common that they contain reference to mutual trust and confirm the
necessary implication the court formulated first in Gözütok and Brügge.49
Noteworthy is Spasic,50 in which the Court confirmed the compatibility of Article 50 Charter—
also on double jeopardy—with Article 54 CISA,51 but forgot to make reference to mutual trust in its
decision. As aptly worded by Wasmeier: “One could almost gain the impression that the Court
meant to abandon its previous line, perhaps because it had ‘lost its faith’ in mutual recognition
and mutual trust, which so far have played such an eminent role.”52 There was little time to specu-
late further about the Court abandoning mutual trust in Spasic,53 however. A couple of days later it
handed downM.,54 reaffirming the former line started with Gözütok and Brügge. InM., the ration-
ale underlying the judgment was once again that a decision in another Member State precludes
further prosecution,55 but the Court did not only require deference to final judgments, but also
deference to decisions by authorities not to proceed with a case to trial—so called non–lieu
decisions. Therefore, M. further expands the required trust in foreign legal systems.
Overall, the CJEU broadly interpreted the transnational ne bis in idem rule and allowed very
few limitations.56 It justified its interpretation of ne bis in idem because of the presumed existence
of mutual trust. This is a strong expression of the normative content of trust–based cooperation:
Despite diversity, all EU Member States are presumed to guarantee a sufficiently high standard of
justice, similar to the equivalence presumption in the internal market context.
C. The Validity of the European Arrest Warrant: Mutual Trust and Advocaten
Voor de Wereld
Shortly after the Court established the trust presumption in Gözütok and Brügge, it applied the
presumption within the EAW context. In Advocaten voor de Wereld,57 the first EAW case that
reached Luxembourg, the question of the validity of the instrument was raised.58 The interest
group Advocaten voor deWereld sought annulment of the Belgian Law transposing the provisions
of the EAW into national law before Belgium’s Constitutional Court.
The most anticipated question referred to Luxembourg was whether Article 2(2) EAW, abol-
ishing dual criminality for 32 offenses,59 breached the principle of legality. In summary, the Court
48Case C-436/04,Van Esbroeck, 2006 E.C.R. I-02333 (specifying the temporal scope of CISA); Case C-150/05,Van Straaten v. Staat
der Nederlanden, 2006 E.C.R. I-09327 (defining the meaning of idem); Case C-467/04, Gasparini, 2006 E.C.R. I-09199 (dealing with
time-barred prosecution); Case C-297/07, Bourquain, 2008 E.C.R. I09425 (dealing with sentences that cannot be directly enforced).
49See Van Esbroeck, Case C-436/04 at para. 30;Van Straaten, Case C-150/05 at para. 43; Gasparini, Case C-467/04 at para.
30; Bourquain, Case C-297/07 at para. 37.
50Case C-129/14 PPU, Spasic, (May 27, 2014).
51See John Vervaele, Schengen and Charter-RelatedNe Bis in Idem Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: M
and Zoran Spasic, 52 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1339 (2015).
52Martin Wasmeier, Ne Bis In Idem and the Enforcement Condition. Balancing Freedom, Security and Justice?, 5 NEW J.
EUR. CRIM. L. 534, 549 (2014).
53Id. at 549–50 (acknowledging that “[h]owever, this does not seem to be the case: just some days after Spasic, the Court has
confirmed and reinforced the approach taken in Gözütok/Brügge”).
54Case C-398/12, M., para. 41 (June 5, 2014).
55Id. at paras. 31–36.
56Case C-469/03, Miraglia, 2005 E.C.R. I-02009 (denying not only the transnational legal effect of a decision, in this case it
concerned a decision by a prosecutor not to proceed with charges because charges were brought in court in another Member
State, without determination of the merits).
57Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld v. Leden van de Ministerraad, 2007 E.C.R. I-03633.
58See also Florian Geyer, Case Note: Advocaten voor de Wereld, 4 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 149 (2008); Dorota Leczykiewicz,
Constitutional Conflicts and the Third Pillar, 33 Eur. L. Rev. 230 (2008).
59According to the dual criminality requirement, the allegedly criminal conduct underlying the extradition request must be
criminalized in both requesting and requested jurisdictions. See, e.g., NILS JAREBORG, DOUBLE CRIMINALITY: STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW(1989).
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did not find a breach of the principle of legality and upheld the measure.60 The Council justified its
choice regarding the 32 offenses “on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in the
light of the high degree of trust and solidarity between the Member States.”61 The Court employed
a teleological interpretation by underlining the importance of effectiveness in the mutual recog-
nition scheme, with a purpose of introducing a speedy and simplified mechanism for cooperation.
In accordance with the nature of mutual recognition, the Court held that the definition of the
offenses is a matter of the law of the issuing Member State, which in turn can be presumed to
sufficiently safeguard fundamental rights—including the principle of legality.62 In other words,
presumed trust should mask any differences—plugging the gaps.
As to the purpose of the EAW, the Court, by making reference to Articles 1(1) and 1(2) and
recitals 5 and 7, held that this is:
to replace the multilateral system of extradition between Member States with a system of
surrender,63 as between judicial authorities, of convicted persons or suspects for the purpose
of enforcing judgments or of criminal proceedings based on the principle of mutual
recognition.64
This turned out to be a logic that the Court came to repeat frequently in its subsequent caselaw on
the EAW. Overall, in Advocaten voor de Wereld, the Court gave a clear indication of the path to
follow regarding the EAW—and criminal law more generally—endorsing mutual recognition
cooperation with a strong emphasis on presumed mutual trust.
D. A Hidden Nationality Exception? A Question of ‘How Much’ Trust: Kozlowski,
Wolzenburg, and Lopez de Silva Jorge
One of the novelties of the EAW was doing away with the nationality exception to extradition—a
prominent rule in extradition law65—safeguarded in the constitutions of several Member States.66
The significance of this move is illustrated by the resistance it caused at the national level, in par-
ticular by the various challenges raised at national constitutional courts.67 Similar to the partial
abolition of dual criminality, this is an expression of mutual trust: Even nationals can be safely
extradited within the EU.
There is, however, still some room in the instrument to favor nationals, as well as residents or
persons staying in the executing Member State. Article 4(6) of the EAW optionally allows refusal
of a request for surrender of the abovementioned category “if the European arrest warrant has
been issued for the purposes of execution of a custodial sentence or detention order . . . and that
State undertakes to execute the sentence or detention order in accordance with its domestic law.”
60Advocaten voor de Wereld, Case C-303/05 at paras. 48–61.
61Id. at para. 57.
62Ester Herlin-Karnell, In the Wake of Pupino: Advocaten voor de Wereld and Dell’Orto, 8 GERMAN L.J. 1147, 1154 (2007)
(criticizing this approach: While “such reasoning could be said to be in line with the traditional definition of 'mutual
recognition' . . . the problem is that this does not in any way remedy the lack of maximum certainty in criminal law”).
63Surrender is the term used for extradition in the EAW, underlining the ambition of the EAW to replace or revolutionize
the traditional extradition procedure. See Michael Plachta, European Arrest Warrant: Revolution in Extradition?, 11 EUR. J.
CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 178 (2003).
64Advocaten voor de Wereld, Case C-303/05 at para. 28.
65See Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmány & Rob Blextoon, The Decline of the Nationality Exception in European Extradition?, 13
EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 317 (2005).
66See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 16(2), translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html.
67Shortly after the EAW entered into force, constitutional challenges, mainly relating to the surrender of nationals, occurred
in Poland, Germany, Greece, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic. See Jan Komárek, European Constitutionalism and the
European Arrest Warrant: In Search of the Limits of “Contrapunctual Principles”, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9 (2007);
Zsuzsanna Deen-Racsmány, The European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender of Nationals Revisited: The Lessons of
Constitutional Challenges, 14 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 271 (2006).
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A particular issue in light of this provision is favoring nationals over residents or other persons
staying in that state. The definition of ‘staying in’, ‘a national’, or ‘a resident’ was surrounded by
controversy and interpreted differently by various Member States.68 Accordingly, a number of
cases on the issue appeared before the Court.
I. Kozlowski: A Question, but No Answer—Yet
Kozlowski raised the first preliminary questions on the issues raised,69 which centered on the limits
of mutual recognition in light of protecting nationals. Kozlowski was a Polish national serving a
prison sentence in Germany for unrelated crimes when an EAW was issued to serve a five-month
prison sentence in Poland. The German court subsequently asked questions as to the scope of the
terms ‘resident’ and ‘staying’, and whether they could refuse surrender and execute the sentence in
accordance with its own law, which allows refusal of surrender of a foreign national who holds
‘habitual residence’.70
The Court first “recalls the objective of the [EAW],” namely replacing traditional extradition with
a surrender procedure on the basis of mutual recognition.71 In answering the question as to the
scope of the terms ‘resident’ and ‘staying’, the Court makes three important points:72 First, the terms
‘resident’ and ‘staying’, as in the EAW, “must be defined uniformly, because they concern autono-
mous concepts of Union law”;73 second, the refusal ground of Article 4(6) is included in particular to
improve the reintegration chances of the requested person;74 and third, in order to determine
whether there are sufficient connections between the requested person and the executing
Member State in an individual case, the Court makes an “overall assessment of various objective
factors.”75 In accordance, the Court requires that a requested person is a ‘resident’ of the executing
Member State, meaning that the person established an actual place of residence there, is ‘staying’
there, and when—following a stable period of presence in that state— the person acquired connec-
tions with that state similar to those resulting from residence.76 On this occasion, however, the Court
did not have to go into this issue, as Kozlowski was not covered by Article 4(6) EAW.77
II. Wolzenburg: The Same Question, but This Time an Answer
It was not long, though, before the residency question reappeared. Wolzenburg concerned the
Dutch law implementing Article 4(6) EAW.78 Wolzenburg, a German citizen, worked and lived
with his wife in the Netherlands for over a year when German authorities issued an EAW for
purposes of executing a sentence. The Dutch law implementing the EAW provided a mandatory
refusal ground for the execution of sentences imposed on Dutch nationals.79 A similar mandatory
68See Wouter van Ballegooij and Radka Koch-Hartmanova, Rechtbank Amsterdam LJN AT 9954 en LJN AU 2813, 54
SOCIAAL ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 294 (2006) (regarding the implementation of the provision in the Netherlands).
69Case C-66/08, Kozłowski, 2008 E.C.R. I-06041; see Massimo Fichera, Proceedings concerning Szymon Kozłowski, 46
COMMON MKT. L. REV 241 (2009) (providing a case note).
70Kozłowski, Case C-66/08 at paras. 27–28.
71Id. at para. 31 (referring to Advocaten voor de Wereld, Case C-303/05 at para. 28).
72See Mitsilegas, supra note 23, at 339.
73Kozłowski, Case C-66/08 at para. 43.
74Id. at para. 45.
75Id. at paras. 48–49.
76Id. at para. 46.
77Id. at paras. 55–56; View of Advocate General Bot at paras. 40–112, Case C66/08, Kozłowski (Apr. 28. 2008), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en (providing a more detailed analysis of the issue).
78Case C-123/08,Wolzenburg, 2009, E.C.R. I-09621; see Christine Janssens,DominicWolzenburg, 47 COMMONMKT. L. REV
831 (2010) (providing a case note).
79Wolzenburg, Case C-123/08 at para. 20; Overleveringswet Apr. 29, 2004, Art. 6(2) (“The surrender of a Netherlands
national shall not be permitted if that surrender is sought for the purposes of execution of a custodial sentence imposed
on him by final judicial decision.”).
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refusal ground applies to foreign, non–Dutch, nationals in possession of a residence permit of
indefinite duration.80 Wolzenburg did not possess a residence permit, as he had not resided in
the Netherlands for a continuous period of five years.81
The district court of Amsterdam questioned whether the requirement of an indefinite residence
permit was compatible with Article 4(6) EAW, whether the unequal treatment of nationals of
other Member States in the Dutch law violates the non–discrimination principle of Article 18
of the TFEU, and referred to Luxembourg.
In addressing these issues, the Court first made a number of observations, based on earlier cases,
citing Kozlowski,82 and indirectly Advocaten voor de Wereld,83 to reiterate the general purpose of the
EAW—namely surrender governed by mutual recognition.84 The Court furthermore made reference
to Leymann, in which it held that Member States “are in principle obliged to act upon a European
arrest warrant. They must or may refuse to execute a warrant only in the cases listed in Articles 3
and 4.”85 The Court held that a limited interpretation of the refusal grounds available “merely rein-
forces the system of surrender introduced by that Framework Decision to the advantage of an area of
freedom, security and justice.”86 Before the Court examined whether the Dutch implementation legis-
lation was compatible with the EAW, it underlined that “Member States have, of necessity, a certain
margin of discretion.”87 The Court stressed that while the objective of Article 4(6) is to enable reinte-
gration, it “cannot prevent the Member States, when implementing that Framework Decision, from
limiting, in a manner consistent with the essential rule stated in Article 1(2) thereof, the situations in
which it is possible to refuse to surrender a person who falls within the scope of Article 4(6) thereof.”88
The Court allowed the Dutch deviation from the reintegration objective,89 and thus the exclusion of
EU nationals from the protection of Article 4(6), justified by the abuse argument raised by the Dutch
government. That argument builds on the fear that a “high degree of inventiveness in the arguments
put forward in order to prove that they have a connection to Netherlands society”90 would otherwise
render the system unworkable. The Court found that it is perfectly in line with a reintegration ration-
ale to “pursue such an objective only in respect of persons who have demonstrated a certain degree of
integration in the society of that Member State.”91 When applying this logic to specific categories in
Dutch law, the Court upheld the law and found that it did not violate the principle of non–discrimi-
nation, justified by the requirement of sufficient integration in the Member State of execution.92
Allowing Member States a margin of appreciation in implementing Article 4(6) somewhat contra-
dicts Kozlowski’s holding that the terms ‘resident’ and ‘staying’ are autonomous concepts of EU law.
III. Lopes da Silva Jorge: Setting out the Limits
The last case that requires mention in this section is Lopes da Silva Jorge.93 Lopes da Silva was
convicted for drug trafficking and sentenced in 2003 to five years in prison. In 2006,
80Wolzenburg, Case C-123/08 at para. 21; Overleveringswet Apr. 29, 2004, Art. 6(5) (“Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall also apply to a
foreign national in possession of a residence permit of indefinite duration in so far as he may be prosecuted in the Netherlands
for the offences on which the European arrest warrant is based and in so far as he can be expected not to forfeit his right of
residence in the Netherlands as a result of any sentence or measure which may be imposed on him after surrender.”).
81Wolzenburg, Case C-123/08 at para. 25.
82Kozłowski, Case C-66/08 at para. 31.
83Advocaten voor de Wereld, Case C-303/05 at para. 28.
84Wolzenburg, Case C-123/08 at para. 56.
85Id. at para. 57; Case C-388/08 PPU, Leymannn, 2008 E.C.R. I-08993, para. 51.
86Wolzenburg, Case C-123/08 at para. 58.
87Id. at para. 61.
88Id. at para. 62.
89Kozłowski, Case C-66/08 at para. 45.
90Wolzenburg, Case C-123/08 at para. 65.
91Id. at para. 67.
92Id. at para. 68.
93Case C-42/11, Lopes Da Silva Jorge, (Sept. 5, 2012).
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Portuguese authorities issued an EAW for the execution of that sentence. In the meantime, Lopes
da Silva moved to France, where he was employed and married to a French national. He therefore
requested to execute his sentence in France and stated that extradition to Portugal “would dis-
proportionately undermine his right to respect for private and family life.”94 But the French
law implementing Article 4(6) EAW only allowed for refusal of surrender requests concerning
French nationals.95 The court of appeal handling the request questioned whether the principle
of non–discrimination in Article 18 of the TFEU precludes the French implementation law
and referred the question to Luxembourg.96
The Court first reiterated its finding in Wolzenburg that Article 4(6) allows Member States to
limit the execution of a request for surrender in accordance with the scope set out by the provi-
sion.97 But as the aim of Article 4(6) is reintegration, “nationals of the Member State of execution
and the nationals of other Member States staying or resident in the Member State of execution and
who are integrated into the society of that State should not, as a rule, be treated differently.”98 The
French government argued that it could not execute sentences of non–French EU citizens so long
as the Framework Decision on custodial sentences99 had not entered into force.100 The Court dis-
missed this argument.101 By making reference to Pupino, the Court restated the “obligation to
interpret national law in conformity [with framework decisions].”102 In this particular case, that
means non–French EU citizens with sufficiently established ties to France should be covered by
the reintegration rationale of Article 4(6).103
IV. Some Leeway to Member States, but Within the Bounds of Mutual Trust
The cases Kozlowski, Wolzenburg, and Lopes da Silva Jorge are examples of the wide divergence in
implementation of the EAW.104 The Court in all three cases underlined the EAW’s mutual trust
rationale, only to be refused on the grounds listed therein. Article 4(6) is an example of such a
refusal ground, and the Court in Wolzenburg allowed a margin of appreciation in defining the
categories of persons it protects. The Dutch law requiring specific conditions for nationals of other
EU Member States fell within the margin; the French law drawing a line between nationals and
non–nationals did not. Relevant in this connection is that the Citizens’ Rights Directive lays out
several harmonized standards, and imprisonment in another state has the same effect as expul-
sion.105 The Dutch threshold of five years equates to the Directive’s requirement for permanent
residence, and the Court’s approval should be seen in light of that standard.106
Permitting Member States a margin of appreciation in implementing this refusal ground has
implications for mutual trust, and may lead to differentiated protection between nationals and
non–national residents.107 As concluded by Mitsilegas, Wolzburg leaves a rather “contradictory
94Id. at para. 24.
95Id. at para. 16.
96Id. at para. 26.
97Id. at para. 34; Wolzenburg, Case C-123/08 at paras. 62, 74.
98Lopes Da Silva Jorge, Case C-42/11 at para. 40.
99Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, 2008 O.J. (L327/27) (EU).
100Lopes Da Silva Jorge, Case C-42/11 at para. 45; France instead applied the 1983 Council of Europe Convention on the
Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which only applies to nationals.
101Lopes Da Silva Jorge, Case C-42/11 at para. 49.
102Id. at para. 53.
103Id. at para. 59.
104An important reason for the EAW’s difficulties in practice is the incorrect transposition of the Framework Decision into
national law; see, e.g., MASSIMO FICHERA, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2011).
105Directive 2004/38/EC, 2004 O.J. (L158/77).
106Id., arts. 16, 28 & 33(1); see also Ester Herlin-Karnell, European Arrest Warrant Cases and the Principles of
Non-discrimination and EU Citizenship, 73 MOD. L. REV. 824 (2010).
107See also Mitsilegas, supra note 23, at 344.
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message with regard to the operation of the system of mutual recognition in criminal matters and
the place of mutual trust therein,”108 particularly when trying to reconcile with earlier judgments
on the topic. Wolzburg underlies that some Member States have not yet been willing to equally
trust extradition in relation to nationals and non–nationals.
The EAW aimed to abolish the nationality exception to extradition, as that rule reinforced not
only links between a state and its citizens, but also the notion that a foreign legal system is different
or substandard. This aim is not fully achieved, and Article 4(6) is a reminder. Member States
sought some form of exception to extradition related to residency or nationality, and it turns
out that the reintegration purposes aim in particular at their own nationals, illustrated by the
French and Dutch implementation legislation. These cases signal that limits to mutual recognition
are needed in order to keep the system afloat. The Court permitted Member States some leeway;
however, this cannot violate the principle of non–discrimination, and should be based on objective
factors—the boundaries of which were pointed out in Lopes da Silva.
E. The Relation Mutual Recognition—Mutual Trust Under Examination in Mantello
The first major fundamental rights test case for the EAW was Mantello.109 The Court interpreted
the mandatory ne bis in idem refusal ground of Article 3(2) EAW.110 Italian authorities issued an
EAW for the arrest and surrender of Mantello, an Italian citizen residing in Germany, for purposes
of execution of a 2005 sentence for drug trafficking. At the time, no charges were brought for his
alleged membership in a criminal organization. But in 2008, an EAW was issued for those offenses,
and German authorities arrested him in Stuttgart. The question arose soon after whether Mantello’s
previous conviction in 2005 precluded Germany from executing the EAW. The German Court rea-
soned that when Mantello was prosecuted for the drug offences in 2005, Italian authorities must
have had sufficient evidence to charge and prosecute him for membership in a criminal organiza-
tion, but did not do so for tactical reasons because it would impede ongoing investigations. Did this
violate ne bis in idem, in particular the idem component, and thus invoke the mandatory refusal
ground? The German Court grappled with this issue and referred to Luxembourg.
The Court was effectively asked about the correct interpretation of idem—what constitutes the
same acts—and whether the court should answer in accordance with the autonomous EU mean-
ing attributed to the ne bis in idem provision of Article 54 CISA, or in accordance with national
law—and in that case the law of the issuing or executing state? These questions touch upon the
core of the EAW and mutual recognition more widely and essentially inquire whether an execut-
ing state can assess fundamental rights compliance in the issuing state.111
First, “the Court came to the fairly unsurprising conclusion that its standing case law on ne bis
in idem should be also applied in the context of the EAW.”112 But instead of examining whether
the acts Mantello was convicted for in 2005 were the same acts as those underlying the EAW, the
Court centered its analysis around the element of finally judged—the bis component. The Court
examined whether the decision by Italian authorities not to charge Mantello in 2005 with the
crime of being a member of a criminal organization was irrevocable.113 By reframing the question
108Mitsilegas, supra note 23, at 342.
109Case C-261/09, Mantello, 2010 E.C.R. I-11477; see Jannemieke Ouwerkerk, Mantello, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1687
(2011) (providing a case note); Anne Weyembergh, Arrêts I.B. et Mantello: Le Mandate D’arrêt Européen, 177 J. DROIT
EUROPÉEN 71 (2011).
110EAW art. 3(2) (“The judicial authority of the Member State of execution . . . shall refuse to execute the European arrest
warrant . . . if the executing judicial authority is informed that the requested person has been finally judged by a Member State
in respect of the same acts provided that, where there has been sentence, the sentence has been served or is currently being
served or may no longer be executed under the law of the sentencing Member State.”).
111See also Mitsilegas supra note 23, at 345.
112Katalin Ligeti, Judicial Control in the System of Mutual Recognition – the ECJ’s Judgment in Mantello, 93 KRITISCHE
VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT FÜR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 380, 381 (2010).
113Mantello, Case C-261/09 at paras. 42–44.
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in such a manner, “the Court cut at the heart of the issues of mutual trust underlying the referring
court’s query: [T]o what extent can the executing authority make a decision based on its own
judgment of the conduct of the authorities in the issuing State?”114
The Court approached this question in line with its interpretation of finally judged in earlier
ne bis in idem case law, thus in accordance with the law of the state where the proceedings took
place.115 This, however, left open the issue of which judicial authority is to interpret this law.
Before clarifying, the Court first underlined the importance of the cooperative stimulus of
Article 15(2) EAW, an expression of the trust climate: First consultation between judicial
authorities—dialogue—before litigation. The Court observed that in the main proceedings,
the German court specifically used the cooperative arrangement, and that “it was clear from
the reply given by the issuing judicial authority that the first judgment of the Tribunale di
Catania could not be regarded as having definitively barred further prosecution at national level
in respect of the acts referred to in the arrest warrant issued by it.”116 Consequently, the German
authorities were “obliged to draw all the appropriate conclusions from the assessments made by
the issuing judicial authority in its response.”117 Following these findings, the Court resolutely
concluded that “the executing judicial authority has no reason to apply, in connection with such
a judgment, the ground for mandatory non–execution provided for in Article 3(2) of the
Framework Decision.”118
Therefore, the central question in Mantello is the extent of control that executing authorities
are authorized to perform with under the EAW scheme. According to Weyembergh, “this case
shows . . . very clearly the sensitiveness of [that] question . . . and the uneasiness of the Court
when confronted with it.”119 The Court was clear in rejecting any room for a requested authority
to interpret matters decided in the issuing state.
Mantello, thus, clearly:
[R]eflects the tension between the application of the principle of mutual recognition in crimi-
nal matters on the one hand and the limits of mutual trust between the authorities which are
asked to apply the principle on the other, especially when the protection of fundamental
rights is at stake.120
Instead of trying to find a balance between the two competing interests, the Court prioritizes an
effective principle of mutual recognition by ordering national judicial authorities to respect
decisions made by its counterparts on the basis of presumed trust.
F. The First Rebuttal of the Trust Presumption: N.S. and M.E., Expanded by C.K.
Critiques against the Court’s strict adherence to mutual trust and disregard of fundamental rights
concerns increased following Mantello. It was, however, in the context of the common European
asylum system—a field of the AFSJ also governed by mutual recognition and mutual trust121—
where the Court first made a dent in the trust presumption. The Dublin system of intra–EU trans-
fers of asylum seekers allocates responsibility for each asylum seeker to a single Member
114Mitsilegas, supra note 23, at 347.
115Mantello, Case C-261/09 at paras. 45–47;see also section B of this Article above.
116Mantello, Case C-261/09 at para. 49.
117Id. at para. 50.
118Id. at para. 51.
119Anne Weyembergh, Transverse Report on Judicial Control in Cooperation in Criminal Matters: The Evolution from
Traditional Judicial Cooperation to Mutual Recognition, in 1 TOWARD A PROSECUTOR FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 945,
950 (Katalin Ligeti ed., 2013).
120Mitsilegas, supra note 23, at 348.
121See, e.g., Valsamis Mitsilegas, Solidarity and Trust in the Common European Asylum System, 2 COMP. MIGRATION STUD.
181 (2014).
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State based, among other things, on which Member State’s border the asylum seeker illegally
crossed first.122
InN.S., the Court held that Article 4 of the EU Charter—prohibition of torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment—precluded the transfer of an asylum seeker from one Member State to
another in accordance with the Dublin Regulation if there are systemic deficiencies in the asylum
procedure and reception conditions in the receiving Member State that give rise to a real risk of the
asylum seeker being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.123 The Court “made clear . . .
that ‘non–rebuttable trust’ is not allowed when this would jeopardize the protection of the
fundamental rights of the individual,”124 and put an end to “blind trust across the EU.”125 The
Court did not take the matter lightly as it underlined that:
[A]t issue here is the raison d’être of the European Union and the creation of an area of free-
dom, security and justice . . . based onmutual confidence and a presumption of compliance, by
other Member States, with European Union law and, in particular, fundamental rights.126
Significant in this paragraph is the holding that mutual trust relates to the raison d’être of the
EU.127 By doing so, the Court “revealed that mutual trust is not only a normative principle under-
pinning secondary law instruments but also a distinctive feature of the contemporary EU legal
system.”128 The normative value that it attempts to uphold is to maintain diversity—and a sense
of sovereignty—a core feature of mutual recognition while complying with fundamental rights
norms, one of the foundational values of the EU.129
The Court thus explicitly limited the conclusive presumption of trust, as this “is incompatible
with the duty of the Member States to interpret and apply the Regulation in a manner consistent
with fundamental rights.”130 This rather drastic change to the system of inter–state cooperation in
the AFSJ was subsequently incorporated into the Dublin Regulation.131
The significance of this seminal ruling is wider than the asylum context. According to Mitsilegas,
N.S. “constitutes a significant constitutional moment in European Union law,”132 and “a turning
point in the evolution of inter–state cooperation in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.”133
Lenaerts emphasizes that “what is interesting about the N.S. judgment is that the ECJ did not ground
the principle of mutual trust in the particular context of the Dublin Regulation, but qualified it as a
constitutional principle.”134 In the capacity of constitutional principle, the importance of mutual trust
pertains to the entire AFSJ, and possibly the entire EU.
122Regulation 604/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31 (EU).
123Joined Cases C-411/10 &amp; C-493/10, N.S. and M.E., 2011 E.C.R. I-13905, para. 86; see Maarten den Heijer, Joined
Cases C-411 & 493/10, N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. and Others v. Refugee Applications
Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December
2011, 49 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2012) (providing a case note); the Court later confirmed N.S. in Case
C-4/11, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Puid, para. 30 (Nov. 14, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/.
124Evelien Brouwer,Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU and the Burden of
Proof, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 135 (2013).
125See Cathryn Costello, Dublin-Case NS/ME: Finally, an End to Blind Trust Across the EU?, 2 ASIEL & MIGRANTENRECHT
83 (2012).
126N.S. and M.E., Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10 at para. 83.
127See Gerard, supra note 28, at 71–79 (analyzing mutual trust as a raison d’être).
128See Gerard, supra note 28, at 73.
129See TEU arts. 2, 4(2), 6; TFEU art. 67(1).
130N.S. and M.E., Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10 at paras. 99, 100, 104.
131Article 3(2) allows refusal if there is a systematic deficiency.
132Mitsilegas, supra note 121, at 193.
133Mitsilegas, supra note 23, at 358.
134Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, THE FOURTH ANNUAL
SIR JEREMY LEVER LECTURE ALL SOULS COLLEGE, 6 (Jan. 30, 2015).
480 Auke Willems
N.S. partially followed the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) in MSS v. Belgium
and Greece, which reached a similar conclusion.135 But whereas the CJEU set a rather high
threshold—requiring systemic deficiencies—the ECtHR takes a different approach in the
subsequent Tarakhel case, only requiring “a thorough and individualised examination” of the
impact of a decision on a person.136 Applying this lighter test in Tarakhel, the ECtHR finds
a breach of individual rights, regardless of a lack of a finding of generalized systematic deficien-
cies in the receiving state.137
At first reading, Tarakhelmarks a split between the two Courts. But inN.S., the Court left scope
for individualized examination of fundamental rights, and ultimately “squared the circle between
mutual trust and human rights.”138 In C.K.139 the Court held that transfer under Dublin can be
refused because of individualized circumstances that would constitute a real risk to inhuman and
degrading treatment.
If anything, and to end this section on a positive note from the perspective of fundamental
rights, N.S. and C.K. are indications of a growing relation between the CJEU and the
ECtHR.140 MSS and Tarakhel pushed the boundaries, ultimately leading to N.S. and C.K.. This
is a clear example of the successful dialogue between the two courts on human rights matters
and how one can strengthen protection in the other.141
G. A Human Rights Refusal Ground Under the European Arrest Warrant
Post N.S.? Not Yet
I. Urgent Calls to Extend N.S. to the Criminal Law Sphere
Not surprisingly, following N.S., the question as to whether the outcome should apply to the other
AFSJ fields—like the EAW—came up shortly after. Peers unequivocally found that “logically, the
judgment should apply by analogy to other areas of Justice and Home Affairs law,”142 and
Mitsilegas stated that N.S. “signifies the end of automaticity in inter–state cooperation not only
as regards the Dublin Regulation, but also as regards cooperative systems in the fields of criminal
law and civil law.”143 Similarly, Bay Larsen noted in relation to a ECtHR case on civil law
cooperation regarding child custody in which the trust presumption was rebutted144 that:
There seems to be no particular reason why such a jurisprudence should be limited to mutual
recognition in one specific part of the [AFSJ] . . . and should not affect mutual recognition in
another part of that area (such as penal law co–operation).145
135M.S.S. v. Belgium, App. No. 30696/09, (Jan. 21, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; see Violeta Moreno-Lax, Dismantling
the Dublin System: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 14 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 1 (2012) (providing commentary)
136Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, paras. 103–04 (Nov. 4, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; see Cathryn
Costello & Minos Mouzourakis, Reflections on Reading Tarakhel: Is “How Bad is Bad Enough” Good Enough?, 10 A&MR
404 (2014) (providing a case note).
137Tarakhel, App. No. 30696/09 at para. 115
138Cecilia Rizcallah, The Dublin System: The ECJ Squares the Circle BetweenMutual Trust and Human Rights Protection, EU
LAW ANALYSIS (Feb. 20, 2017), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2017/02/the-dublin-system-ecj-squares-circle.html.
139Case C-578/16 PPU, C. K. v. Republika Slovenija, (Feb. 16, 2017).
140See also Brouwer, supra note 124, at 147 (explaining “the two judgments illustrate the close relationship between the EU
and the ECHR, and the willingness of the two courts to take note of each other’s judgments.”).
141See, e.g., FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU: A MATTER FOR TWO COURTS (Sonia Morano-Foadi & Lucy Vickers eds.,
2015) (discussing the relation between the CJEU and ECtHR).
142See Steve Peers, Court of Justice: The NS and ME Opinions - The Death of “Mutual Trust”, STATEWATCH ANALYSIS,
(Sep. 22, 2011) http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-148-dublin-mutual-trust.pdf (commenting in response to the
Advocate General’s Opinion, which the Court followed).
143Mitsilegas, supra note 23, at 358.
144Šneersone v. Italy, App. No. 14737/09, (July 12, 2011).
145Bay Larsen, supra note 29, at 152.
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But in the EAW cases directly following N.S., the emphasis on the effectiveness of mutual
recognition and the limited options for refusal remained,146 attracting strong criticism.147 It took
several years before the Court applied N.S. to the penal area in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, which
section I discusses more. For example, in Melvin West, addressing consent in cases of onward
surrender, the Court held that only the consent required is of the Member State that carried out
the last surrender.148 The Court reiterated that the EAW operates on the basis of a “high degree
of confidence which should exist between the Member States.”149 While continuing its support
of mutual trust, the Court’s choice for should exist marks a difference with its earlier statement
in Advocaten voor de Wereld, where trust is alleged to already exist. The Court furthermore
stresses that “the principle of mutual recognition does not impose an absolute obligation to
execute the European arrest warrant,”150 referring to the various refusal grounds available,151
an indication that the Court’s earlier rulings on mutual trust should not be understood as
implying blind trust.
II. Radu: The Court Unable—Or Unwilling—to Rule on a Human Rights Refusal Ground
The first case in which the Court received questions on the existence of a human rights refusal
ground in the context of the EAW following N.S. was Radu.152 Radu, a suspect of robbery, was
arrested in Romania on four German EAWs and did not consent to his surrender. Prior to the
execution of the warrants, Radu raised several objections, most notable that the executing state
had to ascertain that the issuing state observes the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR
and the EU Charter, and in case of a breach, the executing authority would be entitled to refuse
to execute the EAW.153 In relation to his claim that he would not be given a fair trial, he raised
only one point, namely that he was not heard by German authorities prior to issuing the war-
rants. The Court rejected this argument. A person wanted for an arrest does not need to be
heard before issuance because this would render the issuing of arrest warrants highly ineffec-
tive, as “an arrest warrant must have a certain element of surprise, in particular in order to stop
the person concerned from taking flight.”154 In addition, the EAW specifically guarantees that
the arrested person is entitled to be heard by the executing authority—Article 14. Therefore,
the Court ruled that the executing authority cannot refuse to execute an EAW on the ground
that the requested person was not heard by the issuing authority.155 By concentrating its deci-
sion on the right to be heard prior to arrest—a non–existing right—the Court avoided the
contentious issue of refusal to execute a warrant when human rights violations occur in the
issuing state.156
146See also Martin Böse, Human Rights Violations and Mutual Trust: Recent Case Law on the European Arrest Warrant, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW AFTER THE
LISBON TREATY 135 (Stefano Ruggeri ed, 2015).
147See, e.g., Matilde Ventrella, European Integration or Democracy Disintegration in Measures Concerning Police and
Judicial Cooperation?, 4 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 290 (2013).
148Case C-192/12 PPU,West, (June 28, 2012); see Samuli Miettinen, Onward Transfer under the European Arrest Warrant:
Is the EU Moving Towards the Free Movement of Prisoners?, 4 NEWJ. EUR. CRIM. L. 99 (2013).
149West, Case C-192/12 PPU at para. 53.
150Id. at para. 64.
151Case C-306/09, I.B., 2010 E.C.R. I-10341, para. 50 (observing that there is no “absolute obligation to execute the arrest
warrant.”).
152Case C-396/11, Radu, (Jan. 29, 2013).
153Id. at paras. 16–19.
154Id. at para. 40.
155Id. at para. 43.
156See also JANSSENS, supra note 8, at 208 (“Indeed, whilst inN.S. andM.E. a moderation of the principle of mutual trust was
necessary in order to avoid a breach of Article 4 Charter, in Radu there was simply no breach of the Charter, and therefore no
need to moderate the principles of mutual recognition and trust’’.).
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Advocate General Sharpston in her opinion, however, came to a different conclusion,
and defended a general refusal ground in case of a violation of human rights.157 Even
though the Court did not follow this part of the opinion, it makes a strong case for such a refusal
ground:
[T]he competent judicial authority of the State executing a European arrest warrant can
refuse the request for surrender : : : where it is shown that the human rights of the person
whose surrender is requested have been infringed, or will be infringed, as part of or following
the surrender process . . . [be it] only in exceptional circumstances.158
The Advocate General proposed a refusal ground in addition to the grounds listed in Articles
3-5 EAW that would be derived from primary EU law—the EU Charter. The simple reason that
the Court did not—or could not—follow the Advocate General was that the case did not raise the
right question.159 This is largely related to the different roles played by both. Whereas the former
must answer narrow preliminary questions, the latter has more leeway to ponder on broader legal
issues. If the Court eluded to a general refusal ground, it would have done so in obiter dicta, as in
this case grounds to make such a ruling were not present. The question was indeed raised whether
Member States are required to derogate from mutual recognition when fundamental rights
concerns arise, and a prerequisite for answering that question in a concrete case is the
actual—and real— existence of such a concern.
Nevertheless, there was disappointment as to the judgment in Radu,160 particularly as it was
anticipated that the Court would, for the first time, recognize a human rights refusal ground. As
anticipated by Tinsley: “[I]t is hoped that the Court will take the opportunity to deliver helpful
precedent on this key component of the EU policy and judicial cooperation system.”161 In Radu,
however, this hope turned out to be in vain.
III. Melloni: Giving Precedence to EU Fundamental Rights, a Matter of Trust?
Shortly after Radu, the fundamental rights issue reappeared in Melloni.162 An Italian court found
Melloni—a fugitive from justice—guilty for bankruptcy fraud and sentenced him to ten years in
absentia.163 Italian authorities issued an EAW to execute the sentence, and he was arrested by
Spanish police. Melloni did not consent to his surrender, but a Spanish court ordered his surren-
der on the ground that he had been aware from the outset of the trial and had deliberately been
absent from trial, as he was represented by two lawyers throughout all stages of the proceedings—
trial, appeal, and the rejection of cassation.164 Melloni appealed to the Spanish Constitutional
157Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Case C-396/11, Radu (Oct. 18, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?
language=en.
158Id. at para. 97.
159See John Spencer, Extradition, the European Arrest Warrant and Human Rights, 72 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 250, 253 (2013)
(unequivocally responding to the question whether the authorities are obliged to give the wanted person the opportunity
to be heard prior to issuing an EAW: “Of course not.”).
160See, e.g., Ermioni Xanthopoulou, Radu Judgment: A Lost Opportunity and a Story of How the Mutual Trust Obsession Shelved
Human Rights, KSLR EU LAW BLOG (Mar. 27, 2013), https://blogs.kcl.ac.uk/kslreuropeanlawblog/?p=416#.Wg8K-kpl82w.
161Alex Tinsley, The Reference in Case C-396/11 Radu: When Does the Protection of Fundamental Rights Require
Non-Execution of a European Arrest Warrant?, 2 EUR. CRIM. L. REV. 338, 350–51 (2012).
162Case C-399/11, Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, (Feb. 26, 2013); see also Giulia Cavallone, European Arrest Warrant and
Fundamental Rights in Decisions Rendered in Absentia: the Extent of Union Law in the Case C-399/11 Melloni v.
Ministerio Fiscal, 4 EUR. CRIM. L. REV 19 (2014).
163A trial in absentia is a criminal proceeding in which the defendant is not physically present. Whereas some jurisdictions
have banned in absentia trials altogether, others not only allow it, but it is actually a commonly used procedure. The large
variety of rules on in absentia trials throughout Europe have long been a source of friction in inter-state cooperation, and the
problem as such predates mutual recognition. See, e.g., Krombach v. France, App. No. 29731/96, Feb. 13, 2001).
164S.A.N., Sept. 12, 2008 (Spain).
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Court on the ground that his right to a fair trial—specifically under Article 24(2) of the Spanish
Constitution—would be violated because he would have no right to a retrial in Italy. Therefore, he
argued, his surrender should be made conditional upon the guarantee of a retrial, or appeal, in
Italy. The Spanish Constitutional Court held earlier that the right to participate in person at trial
was considered to be part of the absolute content of the right to a fair trial affecting human dignity
as protected by the Spanish constitution, and in a similar case it ruled that such an extradition to
Romania would indeed violate that right.165
In the meantime, the provision in the EAW on trials in absentia—former Article 5(1)—was
amended by the new Article 4a,166 which aimed to alleviate some of the difficulties that different
national practices surrounding in absentia trials posed to the functioning of the EAW.167 This new
situation triggered the Spanish Constitutional Court—for the first time ever168—to refer the issue
to Luxembourg.
The relevant novelty of Article 4a EAW for this case is that execution of an EAW must not be
refused if the person concerned “had given a mandate to a legal counsellor, . . . to defend him or
her at the trial, and was indeed defended by that counsellor at the trial.”169 Because Melloni’s sit-
uation met the condition, and Article 4a is an exhaustive provision on the non–execution of
EAW’s in cases of in absentia convictions, the CJEU held that Spanish authorities had no reason
to make surrender conditional upon a retrial in Italy.170 There was no violation of his European
human rights—for example the EU Charter and ECHR.
This outcome left unanswered the question of whether the higher standard for in absen-
tia trials in the Spanish Constitution can be invoked in a situation that falls within the
scope of EU law.171 In this respect, Article 53 of the EU Charter is relevant, which provides
that: “[N]othing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting
human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized . . . by Union and international
law . . . and by the Member States’ constitutions.” The Spanish Constitutional Court inter-
preted this provision as authorizing a Member State to apply its own higher constitutional
standard.172 The CJEU, however, disagrees: “Such an interpretation of Article 53 of the
Charter cannot be accepted,” as it would undermine the unity, primacy, and effectiveness
of EU law,173 as well as mutual trust—an objective of the EAW.174 In this relation, the
Court reminded us of “the objective set for the European Union to become an area of
freedom, security and justice by basing itself on the high degree of confidence which
should exist between the Member States.”175
165See S.T.C., Mar. 30, 2000 (S.T.C., No. 107) (Spain); S.T.C., Sept. 28, 2009 (S.T.C., No. 199) (Spain) .
166Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, 2009 O.J. (L 81/24); the new Article 4a was modelled after the case law of
the ECtHR, see Recital 8; see, e.g., Sejdovic v. Italy, App. No. 56581/00, (Mar. 1, 2006).
167Melloni, Case C-399/11 at para. 62; see also Martin Böse, Harmonizing Procedural Rights Indirectly: The Framework
Decision on Trials in Absentia, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 489 (2011).
168See Aida Torres Pérez, Constitutional Dialogue on the European Arrest Warrant: The Spanish Constitutional Court
Knocking on Luxembourg’s Door; Spanish Constitutional Court, Order of 9 June 2011, ATC 86/2011, 8 EUR. CONST. L.
REV. 105, 119–24 (2012) (regarding the reasons for this first ever preliminary reference).
169EAW art. 4a.
170Melloni, Case C-399/11 at paras. 42–46.
171This issue was already raised prior to the Charter’s coming into being. See, e.g., Leonard Besselink, Entrapped by the
Maximum Standard: On Fundamental Rights, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the European Union, 35 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 629 (1998).
172Melloni, Case C-399/11 at para. 56.
173Id. at paras. 57–60.
174Id. at para. 63 (“[C]asting doubt on the uniformity of the standard of protection of fundamental rights as defined in that
framework decision, would undermine the principles of mutual trust.”).
175Id. at para. 37.
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Various authors agree with the Court that Article 53 Charter does not aim to modify the pri-
macy of EU law.176 For example, De Witte holds that if:
[T]he Charter’s authors had wanted to change such a prominent feature of Community law,
which the Court of Justice had constantly affirmed over the years, they would have formu-
lated it in clear terms; but even if they had wished to do so, the authors of the Charter did not
have the legal authority to modify primary EU law.177
From the viewpoint of protecting the unity and primacy of the EU legal order, the decision in
Melloni is rather uncontroversial and simply reiterates a position the Court defended for a long
time.178 Nevertheless, from a fundamental rights perspective, a number of critical remarks may be
made.179 First, it is not farfetched to apply national constitutional provisions to EAW proceedings,
especially considering the EAW itself refers to these in the preamble.180 Second, in the field of
judicial cooperation in civil matters, a national public order refusal ground is common,181 which
seems rather counterintuitive because criminal law is a field with a much greater potential for
infringement of individual rights.182
The most fundamental concern with the Court’s approach in Melloni, though, is with its focus
on the primacy of non–directly effective secondary EU law over the protection of fundamental
rights—EU primary law.183 Protecting the primacy and effectiveness of EU law is a legitimate
interest, but it should serve protection of individual rights—a foundational value, Article 2 of
the TEU—not vice versa. Defending the effectiveness of EU law, justified by presumed mutual
trust, gives preference to upholding a system of effective law enforcement cooperation among
Member States over constitutional human rights law and “constitutes a serious challenge for
human rights protection.”184
Moreover, the concern was raised that the judgment will erode on constitutional plurality—
Article 4(2) TEU—and that national constitutional courts could trigger Solange185 in response,186
giving rise to conflicts between the CJEU and national constitutional courts.187 The Spanish
176See Jonas Bering Liisberg, Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of Community Law?, 38
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1171, 1181 (2001) (arguing that Article 53 is merely symbolic, and that it was only included to ensure
that Member States would not have to make constitutional amendments; this interpretation was explicitly taken over by
Advocate General Bot in his Opinion); see also Cavallone, supra note 162, at 34.
177Bruno de Witte, Article 53—Level of Protection, in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 1523,
1532–33 (Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner & Angela Ward eds., 2014).
178See also John Vervaele, The European Arrest Warrant and Applicable Standards of Fundamental Rights in the EU, 6 REV.
EUR. ADMIN. L. 37, 52–53 (2013).
179See, e.g., Leonard Besselink, The Parameters of Constitutional Conflict After Melloni, 39 EUR. L. REV. 531 (2014); Nikos
Lavranos, The ECJ's Judgments in Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson: Une Ménage à Trois Difficulté, 4 GRUNDRECHTE 133 (2013).
180See EAW recital 12 (“This Framework Decision does not prevent a Member State from applying its constitutional rules
relating to due process, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of expression in other media.”).
181See, e.g., Regulation 44/2001, art. 34(1), 2001 O.J. (L 12/1) (EC) (“A judgment shall not be recognized 1. If such rec-
ognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in which recognition is sought.”).
182Besselink, supra note 179, at 546 (noting that “[p]rivate law ‘public policy’ is paradoxically a stronger ground for excep-
tions to mutual recognition than public law ‘public policy.’”).
183TEU art. 6(1) (stating that the Charter “shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”).
184Valsamis Mitsilegas, Judicial Concepts of Trust in Europe’s Multi-Level Security Governance, 3 EUCRIM 90, 91 (2015).
185The doctrine developed by the German Constitutional Court that as long as EU fundamental rights are in check with
national constitutional safeguards, no further action or review is required. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFGE] [Federal
Constitutional Court], Oct. 22, 1986, BvR Re Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft 73, 339, 376 (1986).
186Jan-Herman Reestman & Leonard Besselink, Editorial: After Åkerberg Fransson and Melloni, 9 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 169
(2013).
187Asterios Pliakos & Georgios Anagnostaras, Fundamental Rights and the New Battle Over Legal and Judicial Supremacy:
Lessons from Melloni, 34 Y.B. EUR. L. 97 (2015).
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Constitutional Court ultimately followed the Court’s interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter in
Melloni.188 It did not, however, do so easily.189
To complete the discussion on the reach of the Charter, the Court—on the same day it handed
down its judgment inMelloni—held in Åkerberg Fransson that Member States are broadly required
to respect the rights contained in the Charter when implementing and applying EU law.190 Even
though the latter case did not directly concern cooperation in criminal matters, the cases are com-
plementary.Whereas one case guarantees the application of the Charter when EU law is at stake, the
other case holds that the Charter provides an upper limit regarding the safeguarding of fundamental
rights, at least when it concerns a right harmonized at the EU level.191 Fransson—and also the sub-
sequent Jeremy F.192—indicated that when such harmonization has not taken place, the Member
States have a wider margin to provide additional safeguards.193
H. Opinion 2/13: A Showcase of the Importance of—the Presumption of—Mutual Trust
An avenue which the Court used to further strengthen and develop the trust presumption is in the
context of the EU’s accession to the ECHR.194 In the heavily criticized195 Opinion 2/13,196 the
Court declared the draft Agreement for Accession to be incompatible with primary EU law.197
The Court did not limit its analysis to the accession question, but the Opinion’s “relevance goes
far beyond it.”198 The Court expressed concerns that accession could undermine mutual trust and
reiterated that it considers mutual trust an essential component in order to create “an ever closer
Union.”199 The EU’s common values—Article 2 of the TEU—”impl[y] and justif[y] the existence
of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognized and, therefore, that
the law of the EU that implements them will be respected.”200
The assertion that these common values both imply and justify the existence of mutual trust
establishes a presumption that is almost impossible to rebut. The common values that imply trust
are codified in primary EU law—Article 2 TEU—and as such their implied existence is hard to
deny. For example, one cannot easily make the argument that Member States do not share these
values, at least in a broad, abstract manner. But if those same values also justify trust—making it
188S.T.C., Feb. 13, 2014 (S.T.C., No. 26) (Spain).
189See Aida Torres Pérez, Melloni in Three Acts: From Dialogue to Monologue, 10 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 308 (2014) (“While
the outcome does fulfil the mandates of EU law, the reasoning proves quite unsettling.”).
190Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Åkerberg Fransson, (Feb. 26, 2013); see also Case C-206/13, Siragusa v. Regione Sicilia, paras.
24, 31 (Mar. 6, 2014), (giving a broad interpretation of Article 51 Charter’s clause “implementing Union law”).
191See Rick van der Hulle & Rob van der Hulle, De arresten Åkerberg Fransson en Melloni gerelativeerd, 3 TIJDSCHRIFT
VOOR EUROPEES EN ECONOMISCH RECHT 102 (2014) (examining both cases).
192Case C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F. v. Premier Ministre, para. 75 (May 30, 2013); see Christine Janssens, Zaak C-168/13,
Jeremy F., 2 SEW 84 (2014) (providing a case note); Åkerberg Fransson, Case C-617/10 at para. 29.
193See also Daniel Sarmiento,Who's Afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, National Courts and the New Framework of
Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1267 (2013).
194See, e.g., PAUL GRAGL, THE ACCESSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(2013) (regarding the EU’s accession to the ECHR).
195Steve Peers (@StevePeers), TWITTER (Dec. 18, 2014, 2:18 AM), https://twitter.com/stevepeers/status/545523536551768064?
lang=en (calling the judgment “exceptionally poor”).
196Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014 [hereinafter Opinion 2/13]; see, e.g., Special Section—Opinion 2/3: The E.U. and the
European Convention on Human Rights, 16 GERMAN L.J. 106 (2015).
197See Steve Peers, The EU’s Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare, 16 GERMAN L.J. 213, 213 (2015)
(criticizing the decision and discussing that binding Opinion found several obstacles and has made accession very difficult;
criticizing for seeking to protect basic elements of the EU legal order “by disregarding the fundamental values upon which the
Union was founded”).
198Fisnik Korenica & Dren Doli, A View on CJEU Opinion 2/13’s Unclear Stance on and Dislike of Protocol 16 ECHR, 22
EUR. PUB. L. 269, 269 (2016).
199Opinion 2/13 at para. 167.
200Id. at para. 168.
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impossible to argue that there is no foundation for trust as the implied ground is codified in the
Treaties—this in effect creates an irrefutable presumption of trust.
Furthermore, the Court, by “drawing on its previous rulings in N.S. and Melloni,”201 puts
forward something of a definition:
The principle of mutual trust between the Member States is of fundamental importance in
EU law, given that it allows an area without internal borders to be created and maintained.
That principle requires, particularly with regard to the area of freedom, security and justice,
each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member
States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised
by EU law.202
As in earlier cases, the definition predominantly builds on compliance with fundamental rights
but speaks more broadly of compliance with EU law. The Court continued its more familiar line of
reasoning, though, by allowing no significant space for evaluation of other Member State’s human
rights records, as EU law requires this presumption to be firm.203 Accordingly—except for excep-
tional cases—Member States are barred from “check[ing] whether that other Member State has
actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU.”204 One of the
main reasons why the Court found the draft Agreement incompatible with the Treaties is its
failure to sufficiently acknowledge—or even protect—the trust presumption, which is a constitu-
tional obligation on Member States.205 This particular reasoning does not display great belief in
the existence of trust: If the trust presumption is well–founded in practice, this should not be a
concern. The Meijers Committee also doubted the implications of a Member State checking
another’s human rights compliance, whether it:
[W]ould seriously threaten the balance between mutual trust and human rights obligations,
and hence undermine the autonomy of EU law, . . . [instead] such checks are rather likely to
reinforce the integrity of Union law.206
Turning the trust presumption into an obligation207 seems to embody a further step in
preserving the mutual trust fiction. Such “an interpretation is far removed from what even an
everyday notion of a concept of trust entails; few would contest that if one would be ‘obliged’
to trust (under penalty of law) this can no longer be considered a genuine trust relation.”208
This “represents a significant challenge to our understanding of the EU constitutional order as
a legal order underpinned by the protection of fundamental rights.”209
Opinion 2/13 moreover determines—elevates—the status of mutual trust, namely a principle
“of fundamental importance in EU law.”210 The Court seemed unsure whether a subjective notion
such as trust could carry the weight of a general principle of EU law211 that can satisfy
201Lenaerts, supra note 134, at 6.
202Opinion 2/13 at para. 191.
203Id. at para. 192.
204Id.
205Id. at para. 194.
206Meijers Committee, Note on Mutual trust and Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the European Union to the European
Convention on Human Rights, CM1604 3 (2016), http://www.commissie meijers.nl/nl/comments/406.
207Opinion 2/13 at para. 194, (“EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those Member States.”).
208Willems, supra note 3, at 226.
209Mitsilegas, supra note 184, at 92.
210Opinion 2/13, at para. 191.
211See generally TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW (2d ed. 2007); see John Vervaele, European Criminal
Law and General Principles of Union Law, in EUROPEAN EVIDENCE WARRANT: TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL INQUIRIES IN THE
EU 131 (John Vervaele ed., 2005) (regarding criminal law).
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requirements of legal certainty.212 It therefore stayed short of according the status of a general
principle of EU law, but rather cleverly labels it a principle of fundamental importance, without
the addition “of EU law.” This contributes further to mutual trust’s status as a quasi–constitutional
axiom,213 and leaves much to desire as to what such a principle is. That it is a principle with legal
relevance is clear, but by categorizing it as an elevated principle, not a general principle, it must be
further developed what status—and content—it has.
I. A Change of Direction, More Deference to Fundamental Rights and Less to Mutual
Trust: Lanigan, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, and Onwards
I. Lanigan: Change is in the Air
In Radu andMelloni, the general question of whether a Member State can be required to scrutinize
the fundamental rights compliance of its fellow Member States was left open. Subsequently, the
emphasis on the importance of mutual trust and its presumed existence was strengthened by
Opinion 2/13. Nevertheless, the issue of the negative impact of mutual trust on fundamental rights
remained on the agenda, and a change of direction was in the making. First, in Lanigan, the Court
made strong reference to the importance of respect for human rights, and subsequently in the
landmark case Aranyosi and Căldăraru, rebuttal of mutual trust materialized.
In Lanigan,214 the issue of expiration of the EAW’s time limits was raised, which relates to the
right to a speedy trial as an aspect of the fundamental right to a fair trial. The Irish High Court
asked the CJEU whether the failure to observe those time limits precludes it from executing the
EAW and whether Lanigan may be held in custody even though the total duration of the period
he has spent in custody exceeds those time limits. Lanigan, who was wanted on murder charges in
the UK, resisted the extradition and during his appeal he was detained in Ireland. In its reply, the
Court first reiterated the need for strict compliance to the time limits in the EAW.215 Nevertheless,
in the case at hand, the continued detention of Lanigan did not invalidate the EAW itself, nor was
there an obligation to release him. This outcome seems rather contradictory with the Court
stressing strict time limits. But according to the Court, the underlying principle is that even if
deadlines expire, the EAW remains valid; in other words, saying that “the ‘time limit’ was not
really a time limit at all.”216
To mitigate the absence of a real deadline to execute an EAW—and accordingly the obligation
to release a fugitive—which could result in indefinite detention without trial, the Court
emphasized the duty of both the issuing and the executing states to observe fundamental rights
obligations, in a similar vein as in Jeremy F.217 The rules on detention are subject to Article 6 of the
EU Charter—the right to liberty and security—and Article 5 of the ECHR.218 Still, because in this
case no fundamental rights were actually violated, the Court did not have to go into the possible
consequence of such a finding. Nevertheless, Lanigan shows signs of a Court being increasingly
concerned with fundamental rights within the EAW system.
212See also Mitsilegas, supra note 184, at 92 (“The Court asserts boldly that mutual trust is not only a principle, but also a
principle of fundamental importance in EU law. This assertion, however, seems to disregard the inherently subjective nature of
trust and the difficulties in providing an objective definition that meets the requirements of legal certainty.”).
213Herlin-Karnell, supra note 13, at 43; see also Gerard, supra note 28, at 69 (“[M]utual trust . . . is widely perceived as
axiomatic in nature.”).
214Case C-237/15 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality v. Lanigan, (July 16, 2015).
215See also Jeremy F., Case C-168/13 PPU at paras. 60–65, 73–74.
216Steve Peers, Free at last? Detention, the European Arrest Warrant and Julian Assange, EU L. ANALYSIS (Feb. 5, 2016),
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/02/free-at-last-detention-european-arrest.html (writing that Peers “wouldn’t advise
students, lawyers, journalists or many others to take the same approach to deadlines”).
217Jeremy F., Case C-168/13 PPU at paras. 40–41.
218Case C-294/16 PPU, JZ v. Prokuratura Rejonowa Ło´dź, (July 28, 2016), (aligning subsequently the EAW’s definition of
detention with relevant ECtHR caselaw).
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II. Aranyosi and Căldăraru: A Landmark Ruling for Fundamental Rights and Mutual Trust
In the “eagerly awaited decision”219 of Aranyosi and Căldăraru,220 the Court ruled that the
execution of an EAWmust be postponed if there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment
because of detention conditions in the requesting Member State.221 Favoring human rights over
the efficient operation of mutual recognition for the first time is a watershed moment in the
jurisprudence on criminal justice. It cannot have come as a surprise that the first case was in
relation to prison conditions, as it is well known that these often fall short of minimum standards
across the EU, in particular in times of economic austerity.222
As to the facts of the case,223 Germany received two requests for surrender: Regarding
Aranyosi—a Hungarian national residing in Germany—Hungary issued two EAWs for
prosecution purposes for two counts of burglary. Regarding Căldăraru—a Romanian national
whose case was joined—an EAWwas issued seeking the execution of a prison sentence for driving
without a license. Both men were apprehended in Germany and did not consent to their
surrender.
The ECtHR found earlier that both Hungary and Romania were in violation of Article 3 of the
ECHR—prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment—because of prison over-
crowding.224 The Higher Regional Court of Bremen therefore referred to Luxembourg an inquiry
of whether, in case there is convincing evidence that detention conditions in the issuing Member
State are incompatible with fundamental rights, execution of an EAW should be refused, or that in
such cases, the executing authority must make the surrender conditional upon assurances that
detention conditions are sufficiently safeguarded.225
Advocate General Bot, in his opinion, rejected such an interpretation of Article 1(3) of the
EAW, as it would be contrary to the EAW scheme and its exhaustive list of refusal grounds.226
He held that allowing refusal on fundamental rights grounds would substantially undermine
mutual trust between Member States.227
The Court, however, departed from the Advocate General.228 The Grand Chamber, as per
usual, first reiterated that “mutual confidence between the Member States that their national legal
systems are capable of providing equivalent and effective protection of the fundamental rights
219Rebecca Niblock,Mutual Recognition, Mutual Trust? Detention Conditions and Deferring an EAW, 7 NEW J. EUR. CRIM.
L. 250, 250 (2016).
220Joined Cases C-404/15 & C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, (Apr. 5, 2016).
221See also Emmanuelle Bribosia & Anne Weyembergh, Arrêt “Aranyosi et Caldararu”: Imposition de Certaines Limites à la
Confiance Mutuelle dans la Coopération Judiciaire Pénale, 6 J. DROIT EUROPÉEN 25 (2016); Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, Joined
Cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru: Converging Human Rights Standards, Mutual Trust and a New Ground for Postponing a
European Arrest Warrant, 24 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 197 (2016).
222See, e.g., Eur. Comm. Rep, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (2018); see also Debbie Sayers, The EU’s Common Rules on Detention: How Serious are Member States About
Protecting Fundamental Rights?, EU LAW ANALYSIS (Feb. 17, 2014), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/02/the-eus-
common-rules-on-detention-how.html.
223Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Joined Cases C-404/15 & C-659/15 PPU at paras. 28–63.
224See, e.g., Vociu v. Romania, App. No. 22015/10, (June 10, 2014); Varga v. Hungary, App. Nos. 14097/12, 45135/12,
73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, & 64586/13 (June 10, 2015).
225Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Joined Cases C-404/15 & C-659/15 PPU at paras. 46, 63.
226Opinion of Advocate General Bot at paras. 78–93, Joined Cases C404/15 & C659/15, Aranyosi and Căldăraru (Mar. 3,
2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en; see Gáspár-Szilágyi, supra note 221, at 201–06 (analyzing the
Opinion).
227Opinion of Advocate General Bot, supra note 226, at paras. 106–22.
228It is noteworthy that the positions of the Advocate General and the Court are exactly the opposite from
Radu, where Advocate General Sharpston opined in favor of a human rights refusal ground, and the Court did
not follow.
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recognized at the EU level, particularly in the Charter” is the foundation of mutual recognition.229
Second, it proceeded to set out that it follows from these findings that:
[If the] judicial authority of the executing Member State is in possession of evidence of a real
risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals detained in the issuing Member State,
. . [it] is bound to assess the existence of that risk when it is called upon to decide on the
surrender to the authorities of the issuing Member State of the individual sought by a
European arrest warrant.230
The Court developed a two–tier test to this end. First, it required that “the executing judicial
authority must, initially, rely on information that is objective, reliable, specific, and properly
updated on the detention conditions prevailing in the issuing Member State,” and that any
deficiencies found “may be systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain groups of peo-
ple, or which may affect certain places of detention.”231 Furthermore, Article 3 of the ECHR and
relevant case law impose a positive obligation “to ensure that any prisoner is detained in con-
ditions which guarantee respect for human dignity.”232 But this in itself is not sufficient to refuse
execution of the EAW.233 Second, this leads to the next step, namely the executing authority has
to make “a further assessment, specific and precise, of whether there are substantial grounds to
believe that the individual concerned will be exposed to that risk because of the conditions for
his detention envisaged in the issuing Member State.”234 In order to diligently make this assess-
ment, the executing authority must request, as a matter of urgency and in accordance with
Article 15(2) of the EAW, all additional information necessary to establish the conditions in
which the person will be detained.235 If the executing authority is then convinced of the exist-
ence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment, the execution of the warrant must be
postponed, but not abandoned.236 The executing authority must decide whether the person
wanted will remain in detention—in accordance with Article 6 of the EU Charter and the prin-
ciples set out in Lanigan.237 In case the requested information does not warrant the conclusion
that a real risk exists that the individual concerned will be subject to inhuman and degrading
treatment, the executing authority must adopt its decision on the execution of the EAW.238
The Court thus, for the first time, allowed deferral of an EAW on fundamental rights grounds,
and thereby also, for the first time, favored safeguarding individual rights over the effectiveness of
mutual recognition and mutual trust in the criminal law sphere. It is hard to underestimate the
significance of this judgment for the future development of mutual trust within the AFSJ. It never-
theless raises a number of issues.239
The first issue relates to the exact effect of postponement. The Court carefully avoided creat-
ing a new refusal ground and opted for mandatory postponement instead. Following a postpone-
ment, execution of the warrant “cannot be abandoned.”240 At the same time, the last paragraph
of the judgment states that “[i]f the existence of that risk cannot be discounted within a
229Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Joined Cases C-404/15 & C-659/15 PPU at paras. 77–78.
230Id. at para. 88.
231Id. at para. 89.
232Id. at paras. 89–90.
233Id. at para. 91.
234Id. at paras. 92–94.
235Id. at paras. 95–97.
236Id. at paras. 98, 99 (“[W]here the executing authority decides on such a postponement, the executing Member State is to
inform Eurojust, in accordance with Article 17(7) of the Framework Decision, giving the reasons for the delay.”).
237Id. at paras. 100–02 (stating that such a decision must be made in accordance with the principle of proportionality).
238Id. at para. 103.
239See also Bribosia & Weyembergh, supra note 221, at 27.
240Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Joined Cases C-404/15 & C-659/15 PPU at para. 98.
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reasonable time, the executing judicial authority must decide whether the surrender procedure
should be brought to an end.”241 It is hard to see how systemic deficiencies in detention
conditions will be improved overnight, and it is not likely that this can be remedied within
the time limits set out by the EAW. Moreover, postponing a decision does not directly improve
prison conditions, creating the risk that those guilty of crimes will move to such Member
States in order to enjoy impunity. Therefore, as accurately observed by Gáspár–Szilágyi,
the postponement might “easily amount to a de facto ground of refusal to surrender the
requested person.”242
One could get the impression that the Court intentionally inserted a degree of ambiguity into
its decision. As trust is a process, the first avenue should be Member States resolving such
issues with minimal guidance from the Court, and in the process, establishing better relations
and trust—i.e. build trust.
The second issue is whether this newly created ground for postponement applies only in rela-
tion to detention conditions, or if other human rights infringements also warrant postponement.
The right at stake here—Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 4 of the EU Charter—is absolute and
“is closely linked to respect for human dignity.”243 Like in previous cases (e.g. Radu), the Court
showed a preference for answering the questions referred to it narrowly. The Court explicitly
referred to the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment and not to any other
rights. It is therefore likely that—for now—the ground for postponement only applies in relation
to that specific right. Future cases will show whether this will be extended to other fundamental
rights, most notably to rights that do not have an absolute character, such as, for example, the right
to a fair trial.
A final concern is with the rather high evidentiary threshold required. Because a systemic or
generalized deficiency alone does not warrant a refusal, a two–tier system could come into being.
As long as issuing authorities show that the individual subject to an EAW will not be detained in
an overcrowded facility, general or systematic deficiencies will not have to be addressed. More
practically, Member States could designate good facilities for EAW cases, leaving the problems
for the bulk of prisoners in place. This would be highly undesirable, as fundamental rights should
apply equally and universally throughout the EU.
The Court clearly sought a compromise in Aranyosi and Căldăraru.244 On the one hand, by
not allowing refusal because of systemic deficiencies alone—as is sufficient before the ECtHR
—and by opting for postponement and dialogue, not outright refusal, it attempted to
safeguarded the effectiveness of mutual recognition. On the other hand, it answered to calls
for fundamental rights limitations to mutual recognition and brought its interpretation of
mutual trust more in line with the reality on the ground—a more substantive principle of trust
in accordance with real levels of trust—and real fundamental rights deficiencies— rather than
a formalistic approach.245
Finally, the judgment creates more harmony between the various AFSJ policy fields. The
questions raised after N.S. as to whether its reach can be stretched to other areas of the AFSJ were
answered positively. Aranyosi and Căldăraru effectively applied N.S.mutatis mutandis to the field
of penal law. By doing, so mutual trust gained credibility as a constitutional principle, as different
levels of fundamental rights protection within a true AFSJ—aspiring to constitute a single legal
space—are hard to justify.
241Id. at para. 104.
242Gáspár-Szilágyi, supra note 221, at 216.
243Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Joined Cases C-404/15 & C-659/15 PPU at para. 85.
244See also Bribosia and Weyembergh, supra note 221, at 27.
245See also Gáspár-Szilágyi, supra note 221, at 211 (“[T]he CJEU decided to reconcile the protection of fundamental rights
with the principles of mutual trust and recognition.”).
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III. A Continuation of the ‘New Approach’: Bob–Dogi and Onwards
Lanigan and Aranyosi and Căldăraru proved to be the beginning of closer scrutiny of issuing
Member States’ laws and practices in the EAW context.246 Or, alternatively, of balancing the effec-
tiveness of mutual recognition justified by trust with due process. In Bob–Dogi,247 the Court held
that EAWs cannot be issued as individual measures, but need to be underpinned by a national arrest
warrant, most importantly because issuing a national arrest warrant guarantees the protection of the
suspect’s fundamental rights. The otherwise prominent presence of the objective of efficiency of the
EAW system was surprisingly absent in this case and only briefly mentioned.
Dworzecki248 concerned once again an in absentia trial and the Court stressed that Member
States had to make all possible efforts to find a fugitive prior to trial. If not, non–execution is
allowed. This ground for refusal already existed in the EAW, but its reach was extended in favor
of safeguarding individual rights.
In a subsequent series of three cases—all handed down on the same day—on the correct inter-
pretation of judicial authority for the purposes of issuing EAWs, the Court held that Member States
do not have unlimited discretion in deciding exactly who gets to carry this title. Judicial authorities
may extend beyond judges, such as Hungarian prosecutors,249 but do not include the Swedish
police,250 nor Lithuanian ministry of justice officials.251 Therefore, in the latter two cases, the
EAWs were never validly issued to begin with, in effect adding a ground for non–execution.
In Tupikas,252 inquiring once more into in absentia trials, the Court ruled that “the principles of
mutual trust and recognition on which that Framework Decision [EAW] is based must not in any
way undermine the fundamental rights guaranteed to the persons concerned.”253 This is another
strong signal that the days when conflicts between mutual trust and fundamental rights were, by
default, resolved in favor of the former are gone.254
Finally, the Court made the special character of mutual trust insightful by distinguishing the
EAW from extradition to third states.255 Regarding the former, the CJEU requires (e.g. in Aranyosi
and Căldăraru) a rather high threshold to rebut the trust presumption. Whereas, regarding extra-
dition to Russia in Petruhhin,256 the Court held that establishing the existence of an individualised
risk, in addition to a more general risk, is not needed.257
There are still many more fundamental rights related issues in the EAW context,258 but the
recent series of “rulings suggest a significant change of direction . . . and may have opened up
246See Ermioni Xanthopoulou, Mutual Trust and Rights in EU Criminal Law and Asylum Law: Three Phases of Evolution
and the Uncharted Territory Beyond Blind Trust, 55 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 489 (2018) (arguing that these are steps towards
the third phase of mutual trust, embracing individual rights assessment, as in asylum law).
247Case C241/15, Bob-Dogi, (June 1, 2016).
248Case C108/16 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie v. Dworzecki, (May 24, 2016).
249Case C453/16 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie v. Özçelik, (Nov. 10, 2016).
250Case C452/16 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie v. Poltorak, (Nov. 10, 2016).
251Case C477/16 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie v. Kovalkovas, (Nov. 10, 2016).
252Case C270/17 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie v. Tupikas, (Aug. 10, 2017).
253Id. at para. 59.
254See also Case C271/17 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie v. Zdziaszek, para. 66 (Aug. 10, 2017).
255See Cecilia Rizcallah, European and International Criminal Cooperation: A Matter of Trust? Case Note 1/2017, COLLEGE
EUR. CASE NOTES (2017).
256Case C-182/15, Petruhhin v. Latvijas Republikas Ģenerālprokuratūra, (Sept. 6, 2016); see Martin Böse, Mutual
Recognition, Extradition to Third Countries and Union Citizenship: Petruhhin, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1781 (2017).
257André Klip, Europeans First!: Petruhhin, an Unexpected Revolution in Extradition Law, 25 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. &
CRIM. JUST. 195, 204 (2017) (“There is a certain degree of arrogance in the decision. European Union Member States are
always trustworthy and will respect free movement and all human rights. Third states do not deserve European trust and
violate free movement and human rights.”).
258See, e.g., Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and N. Hernanz, Europe's Most Wanted? Recalibrating Trust in the European
Arrest Warrant System, 55 CEPS PAPER IN LIBERTY & SECURITY IN EUR. 19–21 (2013), https://www.ceps.eu/publications/
europe%E2%80%99s-most-wanted-recalibrating-trust-european-arrest-warrant-system (“[T]he proportionality issue
presents one of the major challenges to mutual trust.”).
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the door to addressing others.”259 Aranyosi and Căldăraru proved a much needed reconfiguration
of the interplay between the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust.260 This change of
direction shows the Court is coming to terms with the reality that a trust presumption that does
not allow for any scrutiny of one’s cooperating partner might ask for too much in an area as
sensitive as criminal law.
J. The Court’s Evolving View of the Trust Presumption
The role of the CJEU in the mutual trust narrative is paramount. To come back to the question
raised at the beginning of this Article, whether the Court has played the role of a mutual trust
stronghold, the short answer seems yes. The CJEU is a steady defender of the trust presumption
and attributed a normative meaning to it in three steps: First in the ne bis in idem cases, where trust
was presumed to exist despite a large degree of—penal—diversity, second by putting aside concerns
raised by national constitutional courts in Advocaten voor de Wereld, where a high level of confi-
dence in the context of the EAWwas established, and third in Opinion 2/13, where the presumption
of trust was further elevated. The Court is a guarantor of the efficiency of mutual recognition, and
mutual trust “served as something like a super–principle to enforce mutual recognition.”261
At the same time, the contention that the Court developed the principle of mutual trust “to keep
Member States chained under its command”262 seems a little harsh. It should be remembered that
the Council and the Commission gave the Court the mandate to enforce mutual recognition based
on a high level of trust. The Court has obviously taken that role very serious, but as the adjudicator
of EU law its core function is exactly to protect the primacy and effectiveness of EU law.
A separate and more recent narrative forms through the emerging room for rebuttal of the trust
presumption, first in N.S. and second in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, where the Court just stayed clear
of recognizing a human rights refusal ground in the context of the EAW. This line of cases, most recently
continued in, for example, Tupikas, is more on par with reality and answers to the need of qualifying the
principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust, in light of safeguarding due process rights.263
A key aspect of these cases is that they concern Charter rights, more in particular Article 4. The
Court found a tool in the Charter that enables it to limit the presumption of mutual trust while
preserving the primacy and unity of EU law. This preservation is an objective which it can achieve
by allowing exceptions to mutual trust in the form of Charter rights, or alternatively, limitations
based on the EU’s very own fundamental rights Charter. Therefore, the EU does not need to resort
to legal sources outside of its own legal order.
Moreover, this change of direction matches broader developments within EU criminal law. The
evolving position of the Commission on the matter became more receptive to the idea of rebutting
the trust presumption.264 But also, there were developments in secondary EU law, such as the
259Steve Peers, Human Rights and the European Arrest Warrant: Has the ECJ Turned from Poacher to Gamekeeper?”, EU
LAW ANALYSIS (Nov. 12, 2016), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2016/11/human-rights-and-european-arrest.html.
260See also Fisnik Korenica & Dren Doli,NoMore Unconditional “Mutual Trust” Between the Member States: An Analysis of
the Landmark Decision of the CJEU in Aranyosi and Caldararu, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 542 (2016).
261Wischmeyer, supra note 11, at 360.
262Korenica & Doli, supra note 260, at 542.
263Christina Peristeridou & Jannemieke Ouwerkerk, A Bridge over Troubled Water–a Criminal Lawyers’ Response to
Taricco II, VERFBLOG (Dec. 12 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/a-bridge-over-troubled-water-a-criminal-lawyers-response-
to-taricco-ii/ (noting that the Court continued the Aranyosi reasoning in the recent Tarrico II judgment: “[F]undamental
rights can form actual tangible limits to the effectiveness of EU law, which is not treated anymore as a prevailing mantra”).
264See at 5-6 COM (2005) 63 final, (calling—in its first implementation report—the practice of adding refusal grounds not
provided for by the EAW disturbing, but nevertheless legitimate, as long as “these grounds [are only] invoked in exceptional
circumstances within the Union,” and that “in a system based on mutual trust, such a situation should remain exceptional”),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0063&from=EN; see at 7 COM (2011) 175 final
(specifying in a later report that in the case of poor detention conditions “it is clear that the Council Framework Decision on
the EAW does not mandate surrender”), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0175:FIN:EN:PDF.
German Law Journal 493
European Investigation Order (“EIO”), which includes a fundamental rights refusal ground,265
and the EU’s Roadmap,266 which sets out a program of procedural rights measures.267
Additionally, there has been strong critique from academic commentators and civil society.
From that perspective, the Court codified legislative, policy, academic, and civil society develop-
ments towards a genuine and balanced AFSJ,268 not only focused on crime control and security,
but also on due process and justice.269
While allowing rebuttal of the trust presumption, the Court has, at the same time, been clear
that the “principle of mutual trust between the Member States is of fundamental importance in EU
law.”270 In that connection, mutual trust has been interpreted as “a constitutional principle that
pervades the entire AFSJ.”271 It is unclear, though, whether the Court treated it with the clarity one
would wish of such an important principle. It has “not [been] easy to grasp the theory behind
the Court’s understanding of the principle of mutual trust.”272 Obliging Member States to adhere
to a fiction which is easily rebutted—mainly by pointing to the poor record of human rights
compliance throughout the EU—and then calling it trust opens the door to criticism, and possibly
to mistrust. By removing any significant degree of control for the cooperating judicial
authorities, the Court might have actually eroded levels of trust, contrary to its stated intention
of upholding trust.273
It is uncertain what the empirical basis is for the Court’s strong belief in the existence of trust,
but it seems that it inferred from the simple adoption of mutual recognition instruments in
secondary EU law that mutual trust exists.274 The finding that trust must exist illustrates the
Court’s attitude,275 but feels somewhat forced and runs contrary to the concept of trust—an
obligation to trust cannot be considered genuine trust. De Schutter described the Court’s approach
as axiomatic, as it on the one hand considers trust a “condition de possibilité de la reconnaissance
mutuelle,” [condition] while on the other it holds “comme présupposée par la reconnaissance
mutuelle” [presumption].276 Or in the words of Costello: “[T]his comes close to asserting that
because we believe it, it must be true.”277 If trust would indeed be a precondition to mutual
recognition, justified by the mere existence of mutual recognition instruments, the requirement
265An EIO is a decision by a judicial authority to have investigative measures carried out in the executing state to
obtain evidence, Directive 2014/41/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 130/1); see, e.g., Catherine Heard & Daniel Mansell, The European
Investigation Order: Changing the Face of Evidence-Gathering in EU Cross-Border Cases, 2 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 363
(2011) (regarding the EIO).
266Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009, 2009 OJ (C-295) 1.
267See, e.g., Taru Spronken & Dorris de Vocht, EU Policy to Guarantee Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings: “Step by
Step”, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG 436 (2011).
268See Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, Mutual Trust Before the Court of Justice – A View From CJEU Judge Sacha Prechal, ACELG
BLOG (Nov. 11 2015), https://acelg.blogactiv.eu/2015/11/11/mutual-trust-before-the-court-of-justice-a-view-from-cjeu-judge-
sacha-prechal/ (detailing how Judge Prechal has also spoken of providing limits to mutual trust while not upsetting the
integrity of the AFSJ).
269See, e.g., Ester Herlin-Karnell, The Domination of Security and the Promise of Justice: On Justification and Proportionality
in Europe’s “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”, 8 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 79 (2017).
270Opinion 2/13, at para. 191.
271See Lenaerts, supra note 134, at 6; the Court was clear that mutual trust is a constitutional principle in all areas
comprising the AFSJ In civil matters in Rinau, in asylum law in N.S., and in criminal matters in Melloni.
272Wischmeyer, supra note 11, at 357.
273Wischmeyer, supra note 11, at 367 n.147.
274See also Daniel Flore, La Notion de Confiance Mutuelle: L' <<alpha>> ou l' <<omega>> d'une Justice Pénale
Européenne?, in LA CONFIANCE MUTUELLE DANS L’ESPACE PÉNAL EUROPÉEN/MUTUAL TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN
CRIMINAL AREA 17, 19 (Gilles De Kerchove & Anne Weyembergh eds., 2005).
275West, Case C-192/12 PPU at para. 62.
276Olivier de Schutter, La Contribution du Contrôle Juridictionnel à la Confiance Mutuelle, in LA CONFIANCE MUTUELLE
DANS L’ESPACE PÉNAL EUROPÉEN/MUTUAL TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL AREA 79, 98, 101(Gilles De Kerchove & Anne
Weyembergh eds., 2005).
277Costello, supra note 125, at 90.
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of trust would not have any substance. Such a formalistic and circular reading of the principle
allows the Court to rubberstamp even the most controversial mutual recognition measures—
an example being the absence of a human rights refusal ground in the EAW.
In Opinion 2/13, the Court took its top–down approach of mutual trust too far by almost oblig-
ing Member States to trust. This development is not only worrisome in terms of fundamental
rights protection, but it also runs counter to developments in secondary EU criminal law—for
example, the EIO—that allow executing authorities to assess whether fellow Member States com-
ply with fundamental rights in executing a judicial decision. Indeed, creating a level playing field of
due process guarantees—a development set in motion by the Roadmap—takes time. Therefore,
mutual trust necessarily functions as a workable presumption, but not an irrefutable one. If
Member States are obliged to consider all other Member States to be fully human rights compliant,
there is no longer a need for a concept of trust underlying mutual recognition, because such a
concept would be of importance only if trust can come and go, like in social relations. In that
capacity, trust should serve as a yardstick, an actual indicator of the temperature on the ground,
to move states to respect human rights. Cooperation on a trust basis would be better served by
allowing checks for fundamental rights compliance—yes, under limited conditions—rather than
permitting or obliging governments to turn a blind eye to violations thereof.278 The Court has
shown to be willing to go down this new road in Aranyosi and Căldăraru. Future cases will show
whether the Court will continue this new road, and provide further—much needed— clarity.
K. Conclusion
The Court at first appeared to view trust merely functionally—namely enhancing mutual recog-
nition–based cooperation—going from the establishment of the trust presumption in Gözütok
and Brügge to an obligation to trust in Opinion 2/13. Subsequently, the Court became aware
of the erosion of the grounds underlying mutual recognition, and in the process may have lost
its trust in trust. In Aranyosi and Căldăraru, without going as far as recognizing a broad human
rights refusal ground, it gave a clear indication that there are limits as to the negative impact that
mutual recognition can have on fundamental rights in EU cooperation in criminal justice matters.
Subsequent cases have confirmed this. Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that in the context of
the AFSJ’s criminal law component, the trust presumption should no longer be regarded as rigid
as initially set out. This constitutes a more future–proof approach with the potential to construct
trust, rather than to destruct it.
278See also Olivier de Schutter, The Promotion of Fundamental Rights by the Union as a Contribution to the European
Legal Space (I): Mutual Recognition and Mutual Trust in the Establishment of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,
REFGOV FR 2 WORKING PAPER (2006).
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